Contemporary XML database querying systems have to deal with a rapidly growing amount of data and a large number of users. As a consequence, if access control is used to protect sensitive XML data at a fine-grained level, it is inefficient when it comes to query evaluation, since it is difficult to enforce access control on each node in an XML document when the user's view needs to be computed. We design and develop a secure XML querying system namely SQS, where caching is used to store query results and security information. Depending on whether there is a cache hit or not, user queries are rewritten into secure system queries that are executed either on the cached query results or on the original XML document. When the cache is full, the entries may be replaced with various replacement schemes. We also experimentally demonstrate the performance of the SQS system.
INTRODUCTION
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) has been widely used for data sharing and exchange over the internet. As a consequence, XML data security has become an important concern. A lot of research has been done in this area, such as Bertino [3] , Damiani [7, 8] , Murata [17] , Fan [9] , Cho [5] , Bouganim [4] , Miklau [16] , Yu [21] etc., and the standards [18] .
In general, there are three major issues of data security: authentication, authorization and access control. Authentication is to verify the identity of a user; authorization is to find out if the identified user has permission to access data. These two processes are closely related and are inextricable in actual implementations. In our work, we assume that the owner or publisher of the data has done these two processes, so we focus only on access control.
Access control is a general way to control user's access to data [19] . There are two major approaches: discretionary access control (or privilege-based access control) and mandatory access control. Under discretionary access control policy, a user may "grant" read or modify privilege to another user; or "revoke" another user's privilege. The mandatory access control mechanism uses system wide policies, thus cannot be changed by any user. In this approach, each user or user group is assigned a security level; each data item also gets a security level. The security levels have a partial order. The higher the security level, the more sensitive the data. A user is allowed to read a data item only if the user's security level is greater than or equal to the data item's security level. On the other hand, a user is allowed to write a data item only if the user's security level is less than or equal to the data item's security level.
Most relational database systems use discretionary access control. However, it is not suitable for securing XML documents over the internet. The problem with this approach is that an unauthorized user may gain access to sensitive data through an authorized user. Over the internet, when the number of users is large, it is impossible to prevent this Trojan horse phenomenon from occurring. Thus, in our work, we adopt the mandatory access control approach.
We have observed that in reality, the access control rule specifies if a node contains sensitive data at the schema or DTD level, while the actual security information is annotated at the document level. For example, consider an online bookstore. The schema of the documents will specify that customer information is sensitive data. However, each customer's information should have a different security level, so a customer can only see his own information but not the other customer's.
Assume in an on-line bookstore database, the information about the books is open to the general public, thus has the lowest security level. Registered users can see their account information, and each account has the same security level as its owner.
Assume there is a user named Tom, who asks the following query: list the Stephen King's books I have bought. The corresponding XPath query will be:
The SQS querying system will check the cache first. Since there is nothing in the cache that contains this query, the query will be rewritten into
This new query will be executed. The query, the user and the result of the query are then inserted into the cache. Obviously, the result of Q 1 contains that of Q 2 . Thus, the result of Q 2 can be obtained by applying the composing query /*[year="2005"] to the result of Q 1 . Evaluating Q 2 using the result of Q1 will be much more efficient than using the original XML document, since a significant amount of disk I/O cost is saved.
Since native XML data do not have a normalized structure, unlike retrieving relational data and publishing them on the web, querying XML database is intrinsically complicated. Despite many efforts by researchers [9] , it remains to be a question that how to evaluate XML queries efficiently while enforcing access control. In our work, we describe and implement a secure XML querying system called SQS. The system uses an in-memory cache to take advantage of locality of reference and improve query execution. Unlike the traditional caching policy that caches only the query results, the SQS system also keeps the security information in the cache. To the best of our knowledge, the SQS system is the first XML querying system that uses caching for the security information. When a new query Q is executed, the cache is looked up first to check whether there are cached query results that answer Q. By answer, we mean that the result of Q is contained by the cached query results, and the system's access control rules are complied as well. The containment checkup is handled using the techniques described in [15] . If a cache hit, a composing query C is computed and applied to the cached query results to render the result for Q. Otherwise, Q is rewritten into a secure query Q and evaluated over the original XML document. Q and its result are also inserted into the cache for future use. The cache is maintained using RDBMS, where the RDBMS's bufferpool is used as the cache. When it is full, the entries may be replaced with various replacement schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related work of access control for XML documents. Section 3 describes the system architecture. Section 4 discusses the methods we have used. Section 5 shows the results of performance evaluation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK 2.1 XML access control
A number of XML access control models have been proposed. Based on the components of XML document, Bertino et al. [2] suggested using different protection object granularities such as document/DTD, set of documents, attribute, (sub)element and link. To avoid defining authorization for every object and take advantage of the tree structure of XML documents, propagation of authorizations is applied. Access control policies are specified at either the schemalevel or document-level. Damiani et al. [8] defined the authorization strength in their access control model. If there is a conflict between the authorizations specified in an XML document and those specified in its corresponding schema, those with a stronger authorization strength will have a higher priority so to override the others. The propagation of authorizations is either local (to the element's attributes), or recursive (to the element's descendants and their attributes). Furthermore, they defined the authorization type as the combination of authorization strength with propagation type. In Gabillon's model [10] , access control list is used to specify authorization. However, since it is associated with each node, this method suffers when dealing with large XML documents. There are some other XML access control models, such as [12, 17, 22] .
Researchers have developed many techniques for XML access control. In [5] , Cho et al. proposed a method to rewrite user query with specified authorizations into an authorized query, therefore avoid unnecessary authorization check-ups. They also developed a querying system called LockX based on the same technique [6] . The system takes on an input query, a set of access control rules, and an optional schema. If the access to a portion of all the nodes requested by a user query is denied by the access control mechanisms, the query will be transformed by NFA into a query that complies with all the access rules. In [15] , Mandhani and Suciu proposed a novel technique to cache XPath views for XML. Algorithm was designed to determine whether a view can answer a new query. When it does, a composing query will be computed and applied to the result of the view to answer the new query.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The SQS system we developed uses a multi-level access control model. The security levels are specified using nonnegative integers. For simplicity, currently only read access type is considered. The access control rule is simple, yet robust, which requires that the security level of the query (or the query issuer) should be no less than that of the data in order to be granted access. The access control specifications are defined at the document level. In the XML documents, attribute SecurityLevel is added to those elements of particular interest to indicate their security levels. For a datum, the higher the security level, the more restrictive to access it. For a user, the higher the security level being assigned, the more elements that he can access. In an XML tree, the security level is only allowed to increase monotonically from the root to a leaf, which means that no element has a higher security level than any of its descendants. To avoid specifying security level for each single element, authorizations are allowed to propagate both locally and recursively. That is, all the attributes of an element are at the same security level as the element itself; if no SecurityLevel attribute is specified at an element, then this element will be at the same security level as its parent or as its closest ancestor whose SecurityLevel attribute is specified.
This access control model has several advantages. Firstly, it is simple and easy to maintain. The data administrator only needs to specify appropriate SecurityLevel for those sensitive elements in the XML documents, and carefully assign a user a security level so that his security level is greater than those elements he is allowed to read, but smaller than those he is not allowed to access. The range of security level may be up to thousands, which is suitable for the systems that are accessed by a great number of users. Secondly, since there is no access control list, and enforcing access control policy only requires a comparison between the security level of the user and the element he is trying to access, such a system will be easy to implement. As a matter of fact, with simple query rewriting (which will be introduced in Section 4.1), most existing non-secure XML query engines can be used to perform secure XML query evaluations.
We choose to use XPath query language to navigate down the XML tree and retrieve data. The system recognizes the XPath queries defined by the following grammar:
(1) e is an element name, and predicate q can be equalities, comparisons, or paths. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the system. At first, a new query Q is parsed by the query shredder. Then, the cache will be looked up to check whether there is a cached view V that answers the query. If a cache hit, a composing query C is computed based on Q and V, then C is evaluated on the result of V by the query engine; if a cache miss, Q is rewritten into a secure query Q . Then Q is sent to the query engine and evaluated on the XML document.
METHODS 4.1 Query rewriting
For non-secure XPath queries, we need to rewrite them into secure ones by including the user security level information. Suppose a user at security level n issues a query Q. Then the rewriting can be achieved by adding a predicate [@SecurityLevel <= n ] to each node in Q. However, since in our access control model, the security level increases monotonically along a path, we may only need to add the In our system, if the original user query cannot be answered using the cached views, it will be rewritten as above and sent to the query engine; if a cached view can answer the query, the composing query is then rewritten and evaluated on the cached query result.
Cache structure
In our system, cache is used to store materialized views and their security information. The cache is maintained in memory using RDBMS's bufferpool management. As mentioned previously in Related Work, XPath views can be cached efficiently and used repeatedly to answer new queries. Thus, we selectively adopt the cache tables in [15] . We also add columns to indicate query security level, authorization information, as well as auxiliary query information that is used for cache replacement. Therefore, the cache of the SQS system consists of the following two tables (Figure 2 ): The columns viewID, prefix, predicate, all-predicates, comparison-tags provide the same information as in [15] . Querysecurity-level stores an integer which is the security level of the query issuer. Authorization is GRANT or DENY, which is an indicator of whether there is non-empty result associated with the view. If the query result returned by the query engine is empty, this field will be set to DENY, otherwise GRANT. The main purpose of having authorization is to improve the system performance on query evaluation. When authorization is DENY, there is no need to load table XMLData, which improves query processing time since table XMLData is potentially large and accessing it may be expensive. Usage-count records the number of times that this view has been used to answer new queries. Timestamp indicates the time when the view is last used.
Cache lookup
When processing a new query, we need to find a view in the cache that not only answers the new query, but also complies with the access control rules. The answerability is examined using the technique addressed in [?] . Note that there might be a few views in the cache that satisfy the two constraints. Thus, to select the best cached view to answer a new query Q issued by a user at security level S, we develop the following algorithm based on [15] : In the algorithm above, Prefix(Q, k ) is the query left after removing from Q the predicates of the k th axis node and all the axis nodes after, and ConPreds(Q, k ) is the concatenation of all the normalized trees that can map to one of the predicates of the k th axis node of Q.
In our multi-level access control system, it implies that if user security level S 1 ≥ user security level S 2 , then the result of executing the same query at S1 will contain all that at S2. Thus, in the SQL statement, the predicate View.querysecurity-level >= S filters out those views that would not answer Q even though by their semantics they could. Note that the returned views are also sorted in ascending order on query-security-level. This is due to the fact that the greater the query security level, the potentially bigger the result set. The best view that answers query Q is the one whose querysecurity-level is greater than that of Q and is also the closest to that of Q. Our algorithm selects such view correctly.
Cache warmup
In our system, we do not use any particular warmup policy to populate the cache. The system automatically inserts the newly processed query with its result into the cache until the cache's upper limit is reached.
Cache update
Insertion happens when a query is processed and there is still room in the cache. The query result will be inserted into table XMLData and the system will automatically assign a unique key for the field viewID. This key is also returned and used in [15] . Query-security-level will be filled with the security level value of the query issuer. Authorization will be GRANT if the query result is non-empty or DENY otherwise. Usage-count is set to "1". Finally, timestamp is assigned the current system time.
Practically the cache has limited storage. When it is full, it has to eject a certain entry to make room. Our system supports three cache replacement policies as follows:
• LFU (Least Frequently Used):
The view that has the smallest usage-count will be ejected from the cache. In case there is a tie, the system will randomly choose one view to discard.
• LRU (Least Recently Used):
The system selects from the cached views the one that is least recently used to eject. The auxiliary column timestamp serves here to indicate which view has the oldest timestamp value.
• LSL (Lowest Security Level) : The view that has the lowest security level value will be chosen to eject. Unlike LFU and LRU, which are often seen in various cache systems, LSL is special for our system. Intuitively, the view that has a low query security level is not very useful since it cannot answer any query that has a higher security level. On the other hand, the view at a high query security level may potentially be able to answer a lot of queries that have a lower security level, as long as semantically this view answers those queries.
Besides insertion and replacement, the cache needs to be updated whenever there is a cache hit. The update happens to the view that is chosen to answer the new query. It includes increasing the usage-count field by "1" and assigning timestamp the newest system time value.
Note that the processes of cache lookup and cache update will bring overhead to the system. The conditions when such overhead is significant will be studied next. It will also be interesting to see experimentally how LSL does compared to LFU and LRU cache replacement policies.
EXPERIMENTS
This section assesses the performance of the SQS system. In particular, we inspect the effect of cache size, number of queries, security level range and cache replacement policy on cache hit rate. We also inspect the effect of these factors on average query processing time. The results and our analysis are presented.
Experimental setup
The SQS system is implemented in Java. All experiments are performed on a 2.80GHz Intel Pentium IV machine with 512 MB of RAM running Linux. All experimental XML documents are generated using XMark [20] . In addition, each document is modified to include SecurityLevel attribute at some randomly selected nodes. The security level values of these nodes are assigned according to the requirement of our access control model, i.e., from the root to any leaf node, the security level values have to increase monotonically. All XPath queries are generated by our own XPath generator, which is written based on the DTD of the documents generated by XMark. To create an XPath, the generator randomly selects a branch of the DTD tree. In addition, it chooses some nodes along the path and constructs predicates for these nodes. The cache of SQS is maintained by Apache Derby DB [1] . We choose to use Galax XQuery processor [11] to process the XPath queries. Since Galax works on XQuery rather than XPath query, we rewrite XPath query as follows:
for $s in document("<XML filename>")<XPath query> return $s For all the experiments that study the cache hit rate, the queries are processed without the actual execution of queries on the XML database. For those study the average query precessing time, Galax is called to produce the results.
When a new query Q is being processed, at first, the system randomly generates an integer S within the specified secu- rity level range as the security level of query Q. Then, it uses cache-lookup(Q, S) to determine whether Q can be answered by the cached views. If a cache hit, the composing query C is computed based on Q and the corresponding view V; then C is applied to the result of V to construct the result for Q. If a cache miss, query Q is rewritten into a secure query Q ; then Q is sent to Galax to be evaluated on the XML document. In both cases after the result of Q is obtained, Q and its result are inserted into the cache as a new view (if the cache is full, then one entry is ejected first depending on the cache replacement policy). Figure 3 shows the relationship between the cache size and the cache hit rate. The x-axis is the cache size in number of records, and the y-axis is the cache hit rate. For all data points, an XPath query file containing 50000 queries is processed, and the security level range is fixed to 0-1000. Three different cache replacement policies (LFU, LRU and LSL) are studied individually. As shown, when there are relatively fewer cache entries in the cache, LSL gives the best cache hit rate, while LFU the worst. As the cache size increases, the cache hit rate increases as well, but the pace of the increase is getting slower and slower. When the cache size is very large, all three replacement policies have virtually the same cache hit rate. Further increase of the cache size becomes undesirable.
Results and analysis

Effect of cache size on cache hit rate
The reason why LSL gives a better cache hit rate than the other two is because that, as stated previously, the views with higher query-security-level tend to be more general thus "better" than those with lower query-security-level. The more "good" views in the cache, the higher the cache hit rate. Since LSL can select those views with higher querysecurity-level to keep, it will increase the chance of cache hit. For LFU and LRU, since neither the field timestamp nor usage-count is used by the cache lookup algorithm, these two cache replacement policies may discard more potentially "good" views than LSL, thus, showing lower cache hit rates. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the number of queries processed (x-axis) and the cache hit rate (y-axis). For all data points, the security level range is set to 0-1000, and the cache size is fixed to 1500 records maximum. As we can see, the cache hit rate does increase as the number of queries processed increases. This is due to the reason that repeated query evaluation and cache update statistically select those "bad" views to eject and leave the cache with more "good" views. As the number of "good" views becomes larger and larger, the cache hit rate increases.
Effect of number of queries on cache hit rate
Again, among the three cache replacement policies, LSL gives the highest cache hit rate while LFU the worst. The reason is the same as mentioned above. Figure 5 shows the relationship between the security level range and the cache hit rate. For all data points, the cache size is set to 1500 records maximum, and the same XPath query file that contains 50000 queries is used. It shows that the security level range has little effect on the cache hit rate. As the security level increases, the cache hit rate remains virtually constant. This happens since each XPath query is executed at a randomly generated security level within the specified security level range. Although the security level range changes, statistically the relative chance to generate a particular security level remains the same.
Effect of security level range on cache hit rate
This experiment tells us that if the security levels of users are evenly distributed (i.e., the number of users at a security level is about the same as that at another security level), then changing the security level range will not affect the cache hit rate. One factor that does affect the cache hit rate is once again the cache replacement policy, which is consistent with the previous experiments. Figure 6 shows the relationship between the XML file size and the average query processing time. The x-axis is the Table 1 : Cache replacement policy vs. average query processing time XML file size in KByte, and the y-axis is the average query processing time in millisecond. A query file that contains 1000 XPath queries is the input. The security level range is set to 0-1000. And the cache size is 200. For comparison, the same query file is also processed under similar conditions but without using cache. The figure shows an obvious fact that as the XML file size increases, the curve without cache increases at a much faster pace than those with cache. Due to the capability of the experiment computer, we are not able to test larger XML documents. However, by observing the trends of the curves, the separation between the curve without cache and those with cache is clearly expected to be much greater as the XML file size gets larger. The time saving ratio is about 15% and 25% when the document size is around 25 MB and 30 MB, respectively. This demonstrates that the cache can significantly improve the system performance on secure query evaluation.
Effect of XML file size on average query processing time
Note that when the XML file size is small, the average query processing time is even shorter without cache. This is because in our system, processing a query using cache introduces the overheads of cache lookup and cache update. So when the XML file is small, processing queries without cache is quick enough to overcome the overheads caused by using cache, and it takes shorter time.
Effect of cache replacement policy on average
query processing time Table 1 shows the average query processing time as a function of the cache replacement policy. Similar to the other experiments, the result consistently shows that LSL gives the best performance, i.e., it renders the highest cache hit rate and the fastest average query processing time. For the SQS system, LSL is the ideal cache replacement policy.
CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a technique to use caching to improve secure query evaluation. For this purpose, we designed and developed the SQS system, where we defined our XML access control model, along with access control rules and necessary query rewriting techniques. In the SQS system, the cache stores both query results and query security information. The cache is maintained using RDBMS, and its content can be efficiently looked up and repeatedly used to answer new queries. With experimental results, we discussed the factors affecting the cache hit rate and the average query processing time. We demonstrated that the cache can significantly improve the system performance on secure query evaluation.
